Why the Western World Refused to Let Iran Get a Nuclear Bomb?
In recent days — and particularly the night after the United States launched strikes on major Iranian nuclear sites — an intriguing question arose. How come nuclear powers decided that one state is not allowed to have nuclear capabilities?
A friend asked me this earlier in the week, even before the American involvement, as we were watching reports about Israel’s attacks on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure:
“Why is it acceptable for one country to have a nuclear bomb, but not another?”
It’s an excellent normative question. As I tried to offer a balanced explanation, what came to mind was the fundamental structure of the global system — international anarchy.
“Since the world is essentially an anarchy, states live in constant fear of attack or annihilation, so they seek power to protect themselves.”
This reflects the realist worldview in which power — not law, fairness, or morality — is the fundamental currency of international politics. There is no overarching global authority to enforce rules, and as a result, the strong make the rules. From this perspective, opposition to a nuclear Iran isn’t about justice or equality — it’s about preserving the existing power structure, dominated by Western powers and their allies.
This realpolitik approach, however, exists in tension with another vision of global order — one that many leaders have tried to cultivate since the end of World War II. After witnessing the devastation of two global wars, particularly in Europe, policymakers sought to replace raw power politics with rules, diplomacy, and cooperation. One major product of that effort is the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, anchored in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Under the NPT, only five countries—the U.S., U.K., France, Russia, and China—are recognized as nuclear powers. The rest of the world agreed to forgo nuclear weapons in exchange for access to peaceful nuclear energy and a general promise of future disarmament. In that spirit, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal—was signed in 2015 between Iran and the P5+1 countries. However, the agreement ultimately unraveled. Following the U.S. withdrawal in 2018, Iran resumed its nuclear development—initially quietly and then more openly—violating several key provisions of the deal.
Iran’s violations of the nuclear deal unmasked the limits of agreement-based cooperation and showed once again the anarchical nature of a system in which each actor is motivated by self-interest only. That is true not only for Iran, but from the perspective of the world’s most influential powers, the opposition to a nuclear Iran is rooted in strategic self-interest.
- For Israel, a nuclear Iran poses an existential threat. Iranian leaders have repeatedly vowed to eliminate the Jewish state. A nuclear Iran is not a theoretical concern — it’s a direct challenge to Israel’s survival.
- For the United States, a nuclear Iran would dramatically alter the regional balance of power, weaken American influence, and likely trigger a nuclear arms race. Sunni-majority states such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have already indicated that they would pursue nuclear capabilities in response. Such a race would heighten long-term instability and endanger U.S. assets and alliances across the Middle East.
- For Europe, the danger lies in regional destabilization and its ripple effects — migration waves, terrorist threats, and the collapse of Europe’s diplomatic strategy. The JCPOA was a cornerstone of European foreign policy; its failure (if Iran acquires nuclear weapons) casts doubt on Europe’s model of engagement through dialogue, compromise, and soft power.
This brief overview indicates that the underlying logic is consistent, with every actor primarily concerned about self-preservation. Each state focuses on securing its own interests — its survival, prosperity, and geopolitical standing. Indeed, in an anarchic international system lacking a central authority, self-help becomes the only reliable principle. That’s not necessarily cynical — it’s a structural reality.
If that is the reality in which we live, who decided who gets to have nuclear capabilities and who doesn’t? I believe that the answer to this question is related to intentions and consequences.
While different perspectives offer varying answers, the pursuit of a dignified life remains a unifying principle in international politics. Liberal international relations theory suggests that human cooperation and agreement can create a global order while promoting freedom and human flourishing. Realism, on the other hand, argues that human flourishing is unattainable without state security. Although the two paradigms often seem opposed, they frequently converge in their quest for stability as a necessary condition for human prosperity.
If that is the case, we might define legitimate policies as those that promote stability and human flourishing. Thus, when a state’s self-interest contributes to universal well-being, it can also possess moral legitimacy. When it doesn’t, that policy may warrant further scrutiny.
When one tries to foresee the outcome of a nuclear Iran, one might understand why disarming it was necessary. A nuclear Iran could have led to uncertainty, nuclear brinkmanship, coercion, terrorism, and possibly war. All these factors would have caused instability, which would have adversely affected the lives of millions of people.
When viewed this way, preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons was not only a Western priority; it was an effort to uphold the universal principles of stability and human well-being. Therefore, it represented both a realist necessity and a liberal imperative.
